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FREDERICK SCHAUER 
CODIFYING THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: 
NEW Y 0 RK v. FERBER 
Words and pictures may serve an almost limitless variety of pur-
poses. They may be the instruments with which a political pamph-
leteer urges a change in government policy, but they may also 
enable the child pornographer to display for the sexual pleasure of 
paying customers photographs of children engaged in sexual activ-
ity. The former is unquestionably at the core of the First Amend-
ment's protection of freedom of speech and press. 1 The latter is 
equally clearly some distance from that core. 2 In New York v. Fer-
ber3 the Supreme Court held child pornography to be so far from 
the core as to be unprotected by the First Amendment. Ferber 
Frederick Schauer is Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982); Citizens 
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 437 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455, 467 (1980); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Gilbert v. 
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); MEIKLEJOH:-1, POLITICAL 
FREEDm.t (1960); BeVier, The First Ame11dme11t a11d Political Speech: A11 l11quiry i11to the Sub-
stallce a11d Limits of Pri11ciple, 30 STA:-1. L. REV. 299 (1978); Blasi, The Checkit1g Value i11 First 
Ammdmmt Theory, 1977 A.\1. B. Fot::-~o. RESEARCH). 521; Bark, Neutral Pri11ciples a11d Some 
First Ammdmmt Problems, 4 7 1:-~o. L.J. 1 (1971 ); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note 011 
"The Cmtral Mea11it1g of the First Ame11dmmt," 1964 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIEW 191. 
2 
"[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right 
to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (plurality opinion). Doctrinal or strategic 
considerations may lead us to treat all or part of the fringe as legally indistinguishable from 
the core, but this is distinct from identifying a theoretical, prelegal core. 
3 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982). 
© 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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upheld a New York statute4 proscribing the dissemination of child 
pornography regardless of whether the materials were legally ob-
scene under the Miller standards. 5 Moreover, the Court was unani-
mous in reaching that conclusion, 6 giving Ferber the distinction of 
being one of very few cases since 1919 in which not a single Justice 
dissented from a holding that an act of communication was unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. 7 
It would be easy to explain the Court's unanimity of result by 
reference to the undeniably revolting nature of child pornography 
and those who trade in it. 8 But this would be too easy. The Court's 
development of First Amendment doctrine has long been in-
fluenced by a willingness to protect that which would, standing 
alone, command little but condemnation. The course of the First 
Amendment has been shaped far less by the worthy dissident than 
by the likes of the Jehovah's Witnesses with their "astonishing 
powers of annoyance, "9 Brandenburg and his fellow Klansmen, 10 
4 N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980). 
5 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). References to the "Miller standards" incorporate 
glosses from other cases. E.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Splawn v. 
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977). 
6 Justice White's opinion of the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurrence. Justice 
Blackmun concurred in the result without opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice Stevens also wrote an 
opinion concurring in the judgment. 
7 Although I have not conducted an exhaustive search, the only cases that come to mind 
are Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
u.s. 568 (1942). 
8 Because of the doctrinal focus of this article, I do not deal extensively or critically with 
the underlying evidence relating to the nature of the child pornography industry. Well-
documented discussions can be found in Protection of Children Against Sexual E.xploitation: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (I 977); Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 
Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the 
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. Rep. No. 438, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODECO:-!G. &AD. NEWS40; Shom·lin, Prermthrg 
the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535 (1981); Note, 
Child Pomography Legislation, 17 J. FA:\1. L. 505 (1979); Comment, Preyirrgon Playgromrds: The 
Sexploitation of Children in Pomography mrd Prostillltiorr, 5 PEPPERDI:-IE L. REV. 809 (1978); 
Note, Child Pomography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711; Note, 
Protection of Childrm from Use in Pomography: Toward Constillltional arrd Errforceable Legk·lation, 
12 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 295 (1979). Additional materials from the medical and social sciences 
are cited in Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3355 n.9. 
9 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1941). E.g., Martin v. Struthers, 
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 
u.s. 444 (1938). 
10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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Cohen's tasteless jacket, 11 and Frank Collin and the American Nazi 
Party. 12 People such as this have prevailed under the First Amend-
ment not because what they in particular had to say furnishes the 
raison d'etre for free speech, but b'ecause they have been the fortu-
nate beneficiaries of a desire to preserve long-run First Amendment 
values by looking not at isolated instances of speech but at broad 
categories. 13 They have benefited as well from a great reluctance, 
even in the face of extreme cases, to permit First Amendment 
protection to tum on the determination by any official body, even a 
court, of the comparative worth of particular utterances. 14 
Thus we must look beyond the unique repulsiveness of child 
pornography to locate an explanation for the Court's unanimity. 
And what appears on closer inspection of Ferber is a growing con-
sensus within the Court on a doctrinal proposition of great impor-
tance in First Amendment theory-that the diversity of com-
municative activity and governmental concerns is so wide as to 
make it implausible to apply the same tests or analytical tools to the 
entire range of First Amendment problems. This premise provides 
the impetus for making First Amendment doctrine more precise 
and at the same time more complex, developing tools and tests that 
are greater in number but consequently applicable to increasingly 
smaller categories of First Amendment issues. And as the size of the 
categories shrinks, it becomes less necessary to protect that which 
ideally ought not be protected solely to ensure the protection of the 
potentially valuable. 
From this perspective the virtues of subdividing and thereby 
11 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
12 National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977)(Stevens, 
]., as Circuit justice, denying stay); National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 
432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 
U.S. 953, cert. dmied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
13 See Scanlon, Freedom of Expressiott and Categories of Expressio11, 40 U. Plrr. L. REV. 519 
(1979); Schauer, Categories a11d the First Amendment: A Play it1 Three Acts, 34 VA:-ID. L. REV. 
265 (1981); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 915, 960-61 (1978). For an interesting philosophical contrast to the 
prevailing legal view, see Dworkin, Non-Neutral Principles, in READI:-IG R-\WLS 124 (Daniels 
ed. 1975). 
14 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Chicago Police Dept. v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally Karst, 
Equality as a Central Principle i11 the First Ammdmmt, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone, 
Re:>"trictio11s of Speech Because of Its Content: The Pewliar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). Cf Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections 011 the Supreme 
Court's Balatlcittg Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. 
REV. 3 (1955). 
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codifying the First Amendment seem great. But equally important 
factors militate against the pull toward smaller categories and more 
precise tests. Extreme subdivision of the First Amendment 
magnifies the risk that an increasingly complex body of doctrine, 
even if theoretically sound, will be beyond the interpretative 
capacities of those who must follow the Supreme Court's lead-
primarily lower court judges, legislatures, and prosecutors. 15 Com-
plex codes may generate numerous mistakes when applied, and 
First Amendment mistakes are more likely to be mistakes of under-
protection than of overprotection. 16 Ferber, in carving out yet an-
other distinct category of material unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, and for reasons that are relatively novel in First Amendment 
theory, is a significant milestone on the road toward elaborate 
codification of the First Amendment. At the same time it may warn 
us of the dangers of going much farther. 
Although I want to focus on these doctrinal implications of Fer-
ber, that is no excuse for ignoring the case's more immediate impor-
tance. Child pornography is a matter of great current concern, and 
Ferber establishes the framework for a likely wave of new legislation 
and litigation. I would be remiss to leap into broad doctrinal specu-
lation without first paying attention to the need for specific analysis 
of these beginnings of a discrete body of constitutional law relating 
to child pornography. Justice White's majority opinion in Ferber 
admirably anticipates many of the issues that are likely to arise in 
its application. That precision and predictability, however, is a 
product of the Court's willingness to carve out a separate category 
for child pornography. Thus we cannot completely divorce the 
particular analysis of the holding from its broader doctrinal prem-
ises, and a close look at how the Court treated child pornography 
will greatly assist in tracing the Court's progress toward codi-
fication of the First Amendment. 
I. THECASE 
Although forty-seven states and the federal government had 
at the time Ferber was decided enacted legislation specifically ad-
15 See Schauer, note 13 supra, at 305-7. 
16 See TRIBE, AMERICA:-! CO:-!STITUTIO:-!AL LAW 576-84 (1978); Emerson, To-ward a Gm-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALEL.j. 877, 887-93 (1963); Kalven, note I mpra, at 
213. 
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dressed to the problem of child pornography, 17 not all of these laws 
presented the constitutional question posed in Ferber. Twelve states 
directed their legislative efforts solely to the production of material 
involving sexual acts by children. 18 Absent any attempt to pro-
scribe the dissemination of the films, books, or magazines so pro-
duced, the process of photographing an illegal act for eventual 
distribution creates no independent constitutional protection for 
the illegal act itself. 19 The presence of a camera, a pen, or a type-
writer does not clothe unprotected acts with First Amendment 
protection. For example, it would hardly be a defense to a citation 
for speeding on a public road that the speeding car was at the time 
being filmed for an episode of The Dukes of Hazzard. Conversely, 
material protected by the First Amendment does not shed that 
protection merely because it depicts or describes illegal activity. 20 
These twelve states thus skirted any constitutional problem by 
regulating the production but not the dissemination of the material. 
Fifteen other states and the federal government did prohibit the 
dissemination of material depicting children engaged in sexual ac-
tivity, but limited the prohibition on dissemination to material that 
was obscene under Miller. 21 Because Miller-tested obscenity is 
wholly outside the First Amendment, 22 these statutes also avoided 
any constitutional problem under current doctrine. With only a 
rational basis required for dealing with obscenity, 23 imposing spe-
cial sanctions on child pornography that is also obscene presents no 
previously unsettled questions. 
New York, however, was one of twenty states that desired to go 
further. 24 Like the previously mentioned jurisdictions, these states 
17 The statutes are listed in Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2. 
18Jd. 
19 This is merely an instance of the more general proposition that a possible, probable, or 
even inevitable First Amendment use does not immunize otherwise illegal activity. See, e.g., 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
20 So much is implicit in the view that even advocacy of illegal conduct is protected. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 {1969) (per curiam); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 
298 (1957). 
21 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2. 
22 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 {1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
23 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
24 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2. 
290 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1982 
banned the dissemination as well as the production of child pornog-
raphy. But these states did not require that the material be obscene. 
New York, for example, made it unlawful to disseminate "any 
performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than 
sixteen years of age. "2~ Because a distinct section of the same law 
provided a separate sanction for material that was also obscene, 26 it 
was apparent that the first-mentioned section intended to disclaim 
any necessity for a finding of obscenity. 
Paul Ferber was tried for selling two films "devoted almost exclu-
sively to depicting young boys masturbating. "27 Had he been tried 
only under that section of the New York statute requiring obscen-
ity, Ferber might have been convicted under that constitutionally 
noncontroversial section. Indeed, Ferber's counsel conceded in oral 
argument before the Supreme Court that a jury finding of obscen-
ity for Ferber's wares would have been consistent with Miller. 28 But 
Ferber was tried under both statutes, enabling the jury to acquit on 
the obscenity charge while convicting under the section not requir-
ing legal obscenity. 29 Perhaps fortuitously, therefore, the issue was 
presented starkly: Could Ferber be convicted for selling films de-
picting sexual acts by children where those films were not legally 
obscene? 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed Ferber's conviction, 
holding the statute unconstitutional primarily for want of any pre-
cedent for denying constitutional protection to nonobscene mate-
rial. 30 The Court of Appeals also relied on the statute's over-
breadth. Even if the 'statute might constitutionally be applied to 
Ferber and his films, the statute's potential inclusion of medical and 
educational materials rendered it fatally overbroad. 31 
25 N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980). I use "disseminate" in place of the statute's 
comprehensively defined "promote." N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.00-5 (McKinney 1980). 
26 N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.10 (McKinney 1980). 
21 102 S. Ct. at 3352. 
28 /d. at 3365 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
29 /d. at 3352. 
30 People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674(1981). A federal court had previously relied on similar 
reasoning to enjoin enforcement of the statute against a particular publication, St. Martin's 
Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), but that decision was overturned 
because the plaintiff had failed to show any real threat of prosecution. St. Martin's Press, 
Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1979). 
31 52 N.Y.2d at 678. 
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The Supreme Court's nine-to-zero reversal of the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld the facial validity of the statute as well as 
Ferber's conviction under it. 32 Although Justice White's majority 
opinion acknowledged that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
"was not unreasonable in light of our decisions,"33 the Court de-
parted from those decisions to the extent of allowing the states 
"greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of 
children"34 than existed when juveniles were not portrayed. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a melange of 
justifications drawn from diverse strands of existing First Amend-
ment doctrine. 
The Court began by acknowledging the "compelling" interest in 
protecting children. 35 Unlike almost every other free speech case, 
the focus of state concern was not on the harm that the communica-
tion would cause to its recipients or to society. Ferber contains not a 
single word addressed to the effect of child pornography on its 
viewers, or the effect that a proliferation of child pornography 
might have on a community. Rather, the concern was for the chil-
dren used in producing the material. 36 
Although the state interest was therefore in the production and 
not the dissemination of the material, the Court agreed with New 
York that this harm could not be dealt with adequately by a restric-
tion limited to the use of children in the production process. 37 
Legislation so limited would fail to address the special harm that 
came to children from knowing that there was a permanent public 
record of their acts. 38 Moreover, controls limited to production 
32 New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982). For the lineup of the opinions, see note 6 
supra. 
H 102 S. Ct. at 3352. The only courtoutsideofNew York to confront the issue had held a 
similar statute unconstitutional. Graham v. Hill, 444 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978). Two 
state courts upheld relatively noncontroversial statutes limited to production. Griffin v. 
State, 396 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1981); Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981). 
H 102 S. Ct. at 3354. 
35 /d. On the Court's use of the particular term "compelling," see text accompanying notes 
ll0-15 ilifra. 
36 102 S. Ct. at 3355. 
37 !d. at 3355-56. 
38 !d. at 3355. The Court relied in part on the "privacy interests involved." /d. at 3356 
n.10. But nothing in Ferber is helpful in determining the circumstances under which this type 
of interest in avoiding publicity will be applied in the future. See Posner, The Uncertain 
Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUPRE.\IE COURT REVIEW 173. 
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would likely be ineffective. Pornographic materials are produced 
clandestinely, and attempting to deal with child pornography by 
going after only the producers would be an exercise in futility. 39 
The solution, to New York and other states, was to destroy the 
market by prohibiting dissemination. The Court agreed with the 
State that the unquestioned interest in protecting children from 
exploitation could be served only by a restriction on dissemination. 
The Court also agreed that the interest in protecting children 
could not be met by a dissemination restriction limited to the le-
gally obscene.40 The Court correctly noted that the Miller formula-
tion, directed toward excluding the totally worthless from the 
coverage of the First Amendment, proceeds from different prem-
ises than does the concern for those who will be photographed for 
films and books. The perceived dangers to the children involved 
may be equally great if the material contains some serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value, if it does not as a whole appeal 
to the prurient interest, or if it does not as a whole offend contem-
porary community standards.41 For example, a by-and-large faith-
ful rendition of Romeo and Juliet that depicted a fourteen-year-old 
Romeo engaged in a variety of sex acts with a twelve-year-old Juliet 
would not be obscene under Miller, but might produce the same 
harms for the child actors that were central to New York's concern. 
Having accepted New York's strong interest in restricting mate-
rial hitherto held to be within the protection of the First Amend-
ment, the Court proceeded to assess the First Amendment implica-
tions of the restriction, concluding that:42 
The value of permitting live performances and photographic 
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimus. We consider it unlikely 
that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or 
lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an impor-
tant and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or 
educational work .... [I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic 
39 102 S. Ct. at 3356. See also TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 666 n.62. 
40 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57. 
41 !d. Influenced perhaps by the particular result at trial in Ferber, the Court implicitly 
discounted the fact that most child pornography is plainly obscene under Miller. See Note, 
Child Pornography, the First Amendment, and the Media: The Constitutiotrality of Super·Obscmity 
Laws, 4 Cm.tM/E:"'T L.J. 115 (1981). 
42 102 S. Ct. at 3357. 
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value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked youn-
ger could be utilized. 
293 
This approach is in some tension with Cohen v. California. 43 The use 
of the word "fuck" might also not have been an "important and 
necessary" part of Cohen's message of opposition to the Selective 
Service System, but that did not prevent the Court from allowing 
Cohen to determine what method of making his statement he deter-
mined to be most effective. 
Cohen may be distinguised in part because the state's interest in 
protecting children against sexual exploitation seems greater than 
the state's interest in protecting the public against exposure to vul-
gar language. But the Court relied on the fact that the type of 
material employing children engaged in sexual acts is likely to be 
less central to the First Amendment. Drawing support from 
Young, 44 Pacijica,45 and the defamation cases,46 the Court reasserted 
that an investigation into the content of categories of speech was an 
appropriate way of determining that certain categories should be 
unprotected by the First Amendment. 47 The Court therefore con-
cluded that because the category of child pornography contained 
limited speech value, and because there was a great state interest in 
regulating that category, the category would be deemed unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. 48 
Thus, it is not rare that content-based classification of speech has 
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that 
within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be 
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, 
if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is 
required. When a definable class of material, such as that cov-
41 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
44 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
45 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
46 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250 (1952). Although the Court cited Beauhamais for a methodological rather than substantive 
proposition, the reference does keep alive the question of the case's vitality. See Smith v. 
Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Biackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
47 102 S. Ct. at 3358. In this respect the Court perpetuated its failure to distinguish 
content inquiry directed at determining the boundaries of the first amendment from content 
inquiry within those boundaries. See Schauer, note 13 supra, at 290 n.114; Stephan, The First 
t1mmdmmt and Content Discriminatio11, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982). But see Redish, The 
Content Distinction itt First Ammdmellt Analysis, 34 STA:-1. L. REV. 113, 117 (1981). 
48 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 
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ered by§ 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare 
of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of 
competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to 
consider these materials as without the protection of the First 
Amendment. 
[1982 
It remained for the Court to specify the contours of this unpro-
tected category. Curiously, Ferber contains no initial description of 
the category itself, but it is fair to conclude that the category is 
described by reference to the New York statute-material contain-
ing sexual conduct by a child. 49 Ferber's other requirements can be 
viewed as qualifications or elaborations on this basic standard. First 
among these is that the category is limited to visual portrayals of 
sexual activity by children. In almost every imaginable case this 
will be a photographic portrayal. 50 This limitation follows from the 
particular state concerns involved, because a simulated or linguistic 
description of sexual conduct would not involve real children in the 
production. Moreover, the proscribed depictions of sexual conduct 
must be specifically described in the relevant state law, and the 
Court clearly had in mind a specificity requirement such as that set 
forth in Miller. 51 Although the Court indicated that the same types 
of sexual conduct specified in Miller would apply to child pornog-
raphy, it is possible to argue that a more expansive definition of 
those acts could apply to child pornography. Given that Ginsberg v. · 
New York52 permits an adjusted application of the obscenity stan-
dard when materials are sold to children, application of Ginsberg by 
49 The language quoted in the text accompanying note 48 supra supports the conclusion 
that the Court intended the constitutional definition of child pornography to be coextensive 
with New York's statutory definition, subject to those qualifications found elsewhere in 
Ferber. 
50 The exact language is "live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of 
live performances." 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 
51 102 S. Ct. at 3358. The relevant age must also be specified, and id. at 3358 n.17 implies 
that any age up to and including eighteen would be constitutionally permissible. The same 
footnote mentions, with neither approval nor condemnation, statutes that "define a child as a 
person under age 16 or who appears as a prepubescent." /d. (emphasis added). Because the 
Court specifically approved the use of "a person over statutory age who perhaps looked 
younger," id. at 3357, this standard may raise problems. But the lack of an "appearance" 
alternative might raise substantial proof problems in an action against a distributor or exhib-
itor. Because puberty tends to have a standard common law meaning of fourteen for boys 
and twelve for girls, e.g., State v. Pierson, 44 Ark. 265 (1885), there seems nothing wrong 
with an appearance alternative as long as it is sufficiently below the specified age that there 
will be no deterrent effect on use of older people to simulate those more youthful. 
52 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
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analogy would seem to permit an adjusted definition of the conduct 
that may not be portrayed when engaged in by children. Mere 
nudity is undoubtedly insufficient, but there may be some flexibil-
ity with respect to what is to count, for example, as a lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals. 
Ferber adopted two other facets of settled obscenity doctrine. 
The scienter requirement of Smith v. Califomia53 is made applicable 
to child pornography, 54 and thus a defendant must be shown to 
have had knowledge of the character of the materials. 55 And the 
Court also made clear that it would engage in independent constitu-
tional review of particular materials found by lower courts to be 
unprotected. 56 Although commonly associated with obscenity doc-
trine, 57 independent review applies to the full range of material 
lying just outside the borders of First Amendment protection, 58 
and thus this aspect of Ferber breaks no new ground. 
The resultant category of child pornography plainly bears little 
resemblance to the category of obscenity delineated by Miller. The 
Court in Ferber explicitly held that child pornography need not 
appeal to the prurient interest, need not be patently offensive, and 
need not be based on a consideration of the material as a whole. 59 
This last aspect is most important, because it means that the pres-
ence of some serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific matter 
will not constitutionally redeem material containing depictions of 
sexual conduct by children. 
The Court referred to the foregoing factors in terms of having 
"adjusted" the Miller test, but that is like saying that a butterfly is 
an adjusted camel. The category of child pornography is quite 
unlike the category of obscenity, although in practice the materials 
encompassed by the two categories will likely be similar. The dif-
53 361 u.s. 147 (1959). 
54 102 S. Ct. at 3358-59. 
55 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974). See generally SCHACER, THE 
LAW OF 0BSCE.'IITY 222-26 (1976). 
56 102 S. Ct. at 3364 n.28. 
57 E.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
29-30 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (plurality opinion). 
58 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). Other cases are collected in NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3427 n.50 (1982). 
59 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 
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ference in the legal description of the categories, however, will be 
very noticeable in litigation. The prosecution will prevail in a child 
pornography case if it proves no more than that the material con-
tains photographic depictions of children engaged in sexual activ-
ity, that the conduct is specified in the governing statute, and that 
the defendant knew the character of the materials. Under such a 
simple standard, prosecutors will not have nearly the difficulties in 
proving child pornography as they have had in proving legal ob-
scenity.60 
The problem with this streamlined definition, however, is that it 
encompasses material that is hardly pornographic at all. Although 
the Court held that the material need not be considered as a whole, 
it emphasized that it was not deciding whether the law could be 
constitutionally applied to serious works such as medical books or 
National Geographic. 61 This potential reach of the statute suggests 
overbreadth, but the Court barred Ferber from raising the claim, 
relying on the "substantial overbreadth" standard of Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma. 62 Because the possibility of medical book and similar 
applications was so remote when compared to the constitutional 
reach of the statute, the Court held the statute not to be substan-
tially overbroad and thus not subject to a facial attack by one whose 
own conduct was clearly subject to prohibition. 63 
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, the majority's 
approach to the substantive question made the overbreadth issue 
easy.64 By eliminating the "taken as a whole" requirement, thus 
· permitting prosecution of material with some serious value, the 
majority gave the statute a broad reach. Most of the space that 
under a narrower holding would be overbroad was thereby filled 
with constitutional applications. Overbreadth problems are likely 
to arise when a constitutional rule significantly limits the reach of 
60 See Project, An Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California 011 the Control of 
Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 910-25 (1977). 
61 102 S. Ct. at 3363. 
62 413 u.s. 601 (1973). 
6 ; 102 S. Ct. at 3359-63. Ferbers restatement of overbreadth principles, as well as its 
important clarification that Broadrick applies to cases other than those containing major 
nonspeech elements, is more significant than my brief treatment might suggest. A com-
prehensive and critical recent treatment of overbreadth is Monaghan, o~·erbreadth, 1981 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1. 
64 102 S. Ct. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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state power. Conversely, it is hard for a statute to be overly broad if 
the constitutional rule permits broad application. Justice Stevens 
would have preferred a more guarded approach, delaying until it 
arose the question of material with some serious value, 65 rather than 
deciding in this case that the presence of some serious value would 
not prevent a finding of nonprotection. 
The question of serious value produced the other two opinions in 
the case. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would not 
permit the application of a child pornography statute to "depictions 
of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, 
scientific or medical value. "66 And Justice O'Connor emphasized 
just the opposite-that the Court's holding did not require New 
York to except from the reach of its statute material with some 
serious value. 67 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence seems to have been prompted by 
some ambiguity surrounding the majority's reservation of the ques-
tion relating to medical books and Natio11al Geographic. But the ma-
jority's explicit holding that the material need not be taken as a 
whole supports the conclusion that the presence of some serious 
value will not preclude prosecution. Even this conclusion, how-
ever, leaves two situations unaddressed by the Ferber majority. In 
one case a depiction of children engaged in sexual conduct might 
65 /d. The desire to delay a constitutional ruling may be based on two different but often 
confused rationales, elements of both of which are found injustice Stevens's opinion. On the 
one hand we may wish a case-by-case approach to a particular issue, focusing on the contex-
tual factors found in the particular case. See id. at 3366. Apart from this, however, we may 
still choose a less contextual, more categorical, approach to a particular issue, such as the 
serious value issue in child pornography cases, but wish to delay specific formulation of that 
categorical rnle until the case arises that presents the issue most clearly. /d. at 3367. The 
former approach goes more specifically to questions of First Amendment approach, while the 
latter is based on more general considerations relating to the exercise of the function of 
constitutional review. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). The principle of delaying a constitutional ruling until necessary, although based 
on undeniably important factors relating to the role of the Court and the necessity of a good 
record, is too often overestimated. The Court's role as adjudicator should not blind us to its 
role as guider of lower courts and legislatures and setter of standards. See Schauer, "Private" 
Speech a11d the 'Private" Forum: Givha11 v. W ertem Lim School District, 1979 SUPRE.\IE CoURT 
REVIEW 217, 217-18. As the Supreme Court gives plenary consideration to a smaller per-
centage of the cases presented to it, as the number of lower courts increases, as the amount of 
lower court litigation increases, and as there are greater delays before the Supreme Court 
finally decides an issue, then to that extent the consequences of a failure to give advance 
guidance become more severe. If this is true, then the Ashwa11der and related principles 
should be treated more as suggestive than as dispositive. 
66 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
67 !d. at 3364 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
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itself have serious value, 68 a situation to be distinguished from the 
case in which a valueless depiction is part of a larger work contain-
ing value elsewhere. 69 The other and more likely case is that in 
which the work is predominantly serious, rather than merely con-
taining some serious value. 70 
One way to resolve these problems would be to establish a per se 
rule prohibiting without exception the use of children engaged in 
sexual acts. But that solution sacrifices too much of the First 
Amendment on the altar of predictability, for there are situations in 
which such depictions might serve important artistic or educational 
goals. 71 If and when presented with such a case, the Court should 
establish a First Amendment-derived affirmative defense for such 
material. 72 Under such a defense, a disseminator could avoid con-
viction by proving by clear and convincing evidence73 that the 
material, taken as a whole, is predominantly a serious literary, 
artistic, political, scientific, medical, or educational work74 and that 
the depictions of children engaged in sexual conduct are reasonably 
necessary75 to the work as a whole. This affirmative defense would 
satisfy the most serious First Amendment concerns, especially with 
68 Some artistic works might fit this category, as well as material dealing expressly with 
the sexuality of children. 
69 A clever pornographer, for example, might publish an illustrated version of the Ferber 
opinion, or perhaps of this article. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
70 A serious but occasionally explicit version of Romeo and Juliet would seem to fit this 
description. 
71 See notes 68 & 70 supra. Where the work is not predominantly pornographic, the 
humiliation-embarrassment-publicity harm seems to be less. 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J ., 
concurring). Moreover, a predominantly serious publication is not likely to be produced 
clandestinely, and thus it would be easier to reach the producer for the actual practice of 
using children, thus eliminating one of the Court's major justifications for permitting actions 
against dissemination as well as use of children. 
72 Establishing this factor as an affirmative defense, rather than part of the prosecution's 
burden of proof, creates no due process problems. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 
(1982). 
73 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt would give too little respect to the First Ame11dment 
considerations behind the affirmative defense. A simple preponderance standard seems to go 
too far in the other direction, but this estimate is subject to reevaluation based on experience 
in actual trials. 
74 The Court's specific mention of medical and educational works, 102 S. Ct. at 3363, 
suggests that they be specifically included along with the Miller list. 
75 
"Reasonably necessary" is a compromise standard between "essential" and "reasonably 
related." The former would get the courts too far into second-guessing literary, artistic, and 
similar judgments, but the latter might be so relaxed as to be inconsistent with the major 
tenor of the Ferber holding. · 
9] NEW YORK V. FERBER 299 
independent constitutional review at the trial and appellate levels, 16 
while at the same time not presenting the prosecution with the 
major proof problems that would ensue if the prosecution were 
required to prove that the material was not predominantly 
serious. 77 
II. THE PATHS TO NONPROTECTION 
Perhaps the most intriguing feature of Ferber is its doctrinal 
ambiguity. Although it is clear that the Court was determined to 
reach the result of nonprotection, it is difficult to track the Court's 
doctrinal route to that destination. I use "nonprotection" in a broad 
and simple sense merely as a characterization of a result: it is con-
stitutionally permissible to restrict utterance x.in circumstances y. 
But there are numerous doctrinal paths to nonprotection, and the 
multiplicity of means to the same end reflects the increasing com-
plexity of First Amendment doctrine. Ferber is the ideal vehicle for 
exploring the various paths to nonprotection, because it does not 
follow any one of them exclusively. Rather, the majority reaches 
the result of nonprotection by almost randomly picking elements of 
each of the methods the Court has at times used to justify the 
conclusion that an utterance is subject to restriction. In sorting out 
these multiple paths to nonprotection, we may make major prog-
ress toward understanding both Ferber and the increasingly com-
plex nature of the First Amendment. 
A. INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS OF SPEECH 
Certain instances of communication may be unprotected if their 
regulation is merely the incidental by-product of a more general 
state interest. United States v. O'Brien78 and the important commen-
tary it inspired79 have established that state interests unrelated to 
76 See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra. The notion of independent review at the 
trial level refers to a judge's plainly required task of withdrawing a case from consideration 
by the jury if a conviction would violate the Constitution. 
77 CJ. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-25 {1973). 
78 391 U.S. 367 {1968). See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.S {1974). 
79 Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the ·Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Ame11dmmt t\nalysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). See also TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 580-
601. For criticisms, to me unsuccessful, of this approach, see Emerson, First Amendment 
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 470-74 (1980); Farber, Conte11t Regula-
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the communicative impact of the speech may presumptively be 
served if no less restrictive alternative is available and if there is no 
excess effect on communication in fact. 80 Determination that a re-
striction on communication is only incidental to a state regulatory 
purpose unrelated to communicative impact is therefore one path to 
non protection. 
The Ferber majority relied on Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. ?I 
for the proposition that speech may be restricted where it is an 
integral part of some other plainly regulable act, but this line of 
argument received little more than an en passant mention. 82 
Perhaps this is best explained by the logical flaws of the speech-
combined-with-action rationale. All communication has some rela-
tion with some course of conduct. Child pornography is an integral 
part of an illegal act in the sense that an illegal act gives rise to the 
communication and because the publication exists solely because 
there is an illegal act to portray. But these cannot be sufficient 
conditions for nonprotection, for were that the case then both 
Pentagon Papers83 and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia84 
should have been decided differently. The political content in both 
of those cases may provide a distinction, but then it is a difference 
in the value of the speech rather than its connection with illegal 
activity that justifies nonprotection in Ferber. 
If the Court in Ferber had relied on O'Brien rather than Giboney, 
and therefore looked to the State's justification for regulation, this 
approach may have been more fruitful. The state interest in regu-
lating child pornography is not based on communicative impact. 
The state is not concerned, for example, with whether viewers of 
child pornography will as a result set out to exploit or molest chil-
dren. Nor is the state concerned with the effect that viewing child 
pornography might have on community environment or morals. 
Rather, the state is concerned with protecting those children that 
might be employed in the production process. This is an interest in 
tion and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 742-47 (1980); Redish, 
note 4 7 supra. 
80 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The import ofthe commentary, 
note 79 supra, is that the general O'Brien approach is not limited to symbolic speech. 
81 336 u.s. 490 (1949). 
82 102 S. Ct. at 3357. 
83 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
84 435 u.s. 829 (1978). 
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restricting commerce in a product that is created with the use of 
clearly regulable noncommunicative conduct. Perhaps the most ap-
propriate analogy, therefore, is to the use of child labor in the 
publication of a newspaper, and to the question of whether a news-
paper so produced could be restricted as contraband. 85 If we an-
swer that question in the affirmative, 86 then we must ask whether 
anything distinguishes the child pornography case. 
One quick answer is that a regulatory purpose unrelated to com-
municative impact is shown in the child labor case by applications 
of the statute to entities in no way involved with communication. 87 
Child pornography is different because the specific sanctions, al-
though not based on communicative impact, are limited to com-
munication. In this sense the analogy might be to the situation 
where only newspapers were subject to the child labor laws. Gros-
jean v. American Presi8 now comes to mind, but Grosjean was in fact 
a simple viewpoint discrimination case in which the tax was levied 
solely in reaction to the particular position espoused by the major-
ity of newspapers covered by the new tax. 
Although Ferber is therefore not controlled by Grosjean, its result 
cannot be justified by a simple reference to O'Brien. For Ferber as 
well as Young present the special situation in which communicative 
impact does not explain the state's regulatory purpose, but in which 
only communication of a certain form is subject to regulation. Fer-
ber and Young thus present an issue also lurking in the background 
of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego:89 How are we to deal with 
the case in which certain industries or certain formats of communi-
cation present problems unrelated to communicative impact but 
still peculiar to a particular form of communication?90 Similar prob-
8s CJ. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
86 See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mabee v. White 
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
87 Conversely, the absence of such applications would tend to rebut an assumption that no 
intent to regulate communication existed. CJ. Redish, note 47 supra, at 145. 
88 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See Stephan, note 47 supra, at 215-18. 
89 453 u.s. 490 (1981). 
90 I would thus modify the standard distinction between viewpoint discrimination and 
subject-matter discrimination to include a new and separate problem of format discrimina-
tion. The issue is presented by the question reserved in Metromedia of whether a total and 
content-neutral ban on all billboards would be permissible. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. Implica-
tions of a negative answer come from Metromedia itself, id., as well as Schad v. Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). But a different conclusion might be reached regarding a 
restriction of all structures of a certain size, where that restriction included all billboards as 
well as many other structures. 
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!ems would arise if it were found that child labor was a problem 
only in the motion picture industry, or that newsprint contained a 
toxic chemical justifying special safety precautions. 
Ferber and Young are somewhat stickier in that J:he industry in 
these cases is characterized not only by its communicative nature 
but also by the particular nature of the communication. Here an 
industry-oriented regulation is also a form of content regulation. 91 
But where, as in Ferber, the state interest is not with the effect of 
that content on viewers, the special dangers of content regulation 
are absent, and the case is one more of format discrimination than 
content discrimination. 92 Although the Ferber majority did not fol-
low through with its suggestion that this was more a conduct case 
than a speech case, it could have arrived at the result of nonprotec-
tion by concentrating more closely on the state's interest in control-
ling an evil unrelated to communicative impact. 
B. UNCOVERED SPEECH 
Under the O'Brien route, state concerns unrelated to communica-
tive impact can produce the result of non protection. But even if the 
state interest is characterized·as in some way related to communica-
tive impact, nonprotection may be reached by determining that the 
type of communication involved is totally unrelated to the purposes 
of the First Amendment. 93 Some forms of speech are not protected 
by the First Amendment because they are not even covered by the 
First Amendment. 94 For such verbal or pictorial acts, the First 
Amendment's protective devices never come into play. The non-
coverage path to nonprotection justifies treating perjury, price 
fixing, solicitation to nonpolitical crime, and contract law, for ex-
ample, as outside the First Amendment, for these are all categories 
of speech in which the state's justification for restriction is not 
91 Thus the analogue to Young would be a regulation of all theaters, or all bookstores, but 
based on Young's premises. 
92 See note 90 supra. 
93 Because I have previously discussed the matter at length, I will not repeat here the 
argument that such a methodology can be intellectually justified as well as located in existing 
doctrine. Schauer, note 13 supra, at 267-82; Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused? 31 PHIL. Q. 225 
(1981); Schauer, Speech and "Speecb"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise itz the lnterpretatiotz 
of Comtitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). 
94 /d. See also BeVier, note 1 supra, at 301; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First 
Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUPRE.\IE COURT REVIEW 267, 278; Shiffrin, note 
13 supra, at 916 n.17. 
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measured against a First Amendment standard. 95 In terms of issues 
actually coming before the Court, this same methodology is present 
in Roth-Paris,96 in Beauharnais,97 and in Valentine v. Chrestensen. 98 It 
is also supported by some but not all of the language in Chaplinsky. 99 
Of these cases only the obscenity cases survive today, 100 but we can 
nevertheless identify a methodology by which the First Amend-
ment is relevant only in the sense that we must look to its bound-
aries. Once a class of utterance is determined to be outside those 
boundaries, the First Amendment inquiry ends. 
The Court in Ferber refers to child pornography as a category 
outside the First Amendment, and its citation to Chaplinsky, 
Beauhamais (!), and the obscenity cases seemingly supports the in-
ference that child pornography is treated as totally uncovered by 
the First Amendment. 101 But citations and superficial appearances 
can be deceiving, and closer inspection reveals that the denial of 
coverage is not the path the Court follows to nonprotection in 
Ferber. 
One characteristic of the classic noncoverage cases is that the 
determination of lack of coverage is made solely on the basis of the 
First Amendment value of the utterance itself, without regard to 
possible justifications for restriction. 102 For if the utterances in-
volved are totally unrelated to the purposes of the First Amend-
ment, there is no need to consider, except under a rational basis 
standard, why the state might want to regulate them. Ferber, how-
91 See generally Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 A.\1. B. Fot..~D. RESEARCH]. 645; 
Schauer, note 13 supra, at 267-72. 
96 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957). 
97 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
98 316 u.s. 52 (1942). 
99 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). To the extent that Chaplinsky talks 
about "classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem," id. at 571-72, it is consistent with the discussion in the 
text. But in referring to "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and to a "slight social 
value as a step to truth," id. at 572 (emphasis added), and in referring to this slight value as 
having been "outweighed," id., by other interests, Chaplinsky seems of a different genre. 
100 I assume that the original Chaplinsky approach is virtually unrecognizable after, e.g., 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Valentine perished in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Beauhamaisin a 
combination of Brandenburg and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
101 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 
102 See Greenawalt, note 95 supra, at 784. 
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ever, does not separate the question of speech value from the ques-
tion of the strength of the state's regulatory interest. The two are 
considered together, and the Court never determines that child 
pornography, in isolation, is totally beyond the normative func-
tions of the First Amendment. Moreover, the discussion of state 
interest in Ferber seems premised on emphasizing the particularly 
overwhelming nature of that interest, and no such showing would 
be required if child pornography itself were not encompassed by 
the First Amendment. 
The Court's delineation of the category is consistent with the 
interpretatiqn that the category is not beyond the purview of the 
First Amendment. If the Court had in fact followed the noncover-
age path to nonprotection, we would expect to see, as suggested in 
Chaplinsky103 and applied in the obscenity cases, a carefully de-
limited category whose definition was designed to ensure that only 
material with no First Amendment significance was included. But 
because there is no necessary connection between the harm at issue 
here and total First Amendment worthlessness, 104 the category that 
results from Ferber is not defined by the absence of First Amend-
ment value. And so long as there is acknowledged First Amend-
ment value, even if small, in the resultant category, the differences 
between Ferber and the obscenity and other noncoverage cases seem 
more significant than the similarities. 
C. OUTWEIGHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The Beauharnais-Roth-Paris path to nonprotection proceeds from 
the assumption that some utterances receive no First Amendment 
protection at all. Another path to nonprotection proceeds from the 
opposite assumption-that even the maximum First Amendment 
protection is less than absolute. 105 Speech that is covered by the 
First Amendment is not necessarily protected by it, and covered 
speech will go unprotected if the state can demonstrate a 
sufficiently strong reason for restriction. Although it might be pos-
103 315 U.S. at 571 ("certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of spech"). 
104 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57. 
105 Apart from the especially stringent protection against prior restraints, which is still not 
absolute, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the maximum protection 
under the First Amendment is found in the less than absolute protection of Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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sible to construct First Amendment doctrine so that all covered 
speech was eo ipso protected, 106 we have not followed this strategy of 
carefully defined absolutes. Even speech at the core of the First 
Amendment may be restricted if the state interest is sufficiently 
strong. Although we normally associate this high but not absolute 
level of protection with the Brandenburg-Hess107 formulation of the 
clear and present danger standard, 108 it is possible that Brandenburg-
Hess is representative rather than exclusive. Not every enormous 
state interest can fit neatly into Brandenburg's incitement-
immediacy-inevitability formula, and other versions of the general 
clear and present danger formula may remain viable for special or 
novel circumstances. 109 
If we accept that there may be dangers so momentous as to 
outweigh the First Amendment, yet not capable of characterization 
in Brandenburg terms, then Ferber can be viewed as partially relying 
on this "covered but outweighed" path to nonprotection. Although 
the Court does not cite any cases of the clear and present danger 
genre, it does describe the interest in protecting children as both 
"compelling" and "surpassing."110 It may be that "compelling" 
means something less here than it does in its more established equal 
protection context, 111 but it seems more sensible, especially in light 
of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 112 to interpret that language 
as describing a state interest equal in force but different in kind 
106 E.g., E.\IERS0:-1, THE SYSTE.\1 OF FREEDmt OF ExPRESSI0:-1 (1970); Frantz, The First 
1\mmdmmt i11 the Bala11ce, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Meiklejohn, The First Ammdmmt Is a11 
Ab,-olute, 1961 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIEW 245; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: 
Fir.-t Amendment Theory Applied to Libel a11d Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 
(1968). 
107 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per 
curiam). I take the two together because the force of Bra11dmburg's imminence and likelihood 
requirements cannot be fully appreciated without the Hess application. 
108 See generally Linde, "Clear a11d Prese11t Da11ger" Reexami11ed: Dissonance i11 the Bramlmburg 
Concerto, 22 STA:-1. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty Years of"Clear and Presmt Da11ger": from 
Schmck to Brande11burg-a11d Beyond, 1969 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIE\\" 41. 
IO? See especially United States v. The Progressive, lnc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 
1979), mandamus denied sub 110111. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed, 610 
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Van Alstyne, A Graphic Revie'".v of the Free Speech Clause, 70 
CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982). 
110 102 S. Ct. at 3354, 3355. 
111 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
112 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1982). The suggestion in Globe Newspapers is that the "compel-
ling" interest in protecting minors might in some circumstances justify overriding First 
Amendment considerations more vital than those at issue in Ferber. 
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from the Brandenburg-Hess standard. Reports of the demise of De1111is 
may have been premature. 113 
Ferber is therefore important in hinting that interests other than 
preventing disorder may justify restricting even speech at the core 
of the First Amendment. But here the Court backed off. For al-
though it has held that speech other than political is entitled to full 
protection, 114 child pornography is not put in this class. Although 
technically within the First Amendment, it is held to be much 
closer to the fringe than the core. 115 With that determination the 
Court avoided the question of whether the interest in protecting 
children might outweigh speech at the core of the First Amend-
ment, and thus the references to "compelling" and "surpassing" 
interests seem more rhetorical than doctrinal. 
D. LESS VALUABLE SPEECH 
A final path to nonprotection recognizes that not all speech cov-
ered by the First Amendment deserves the same level of protection, 
some forms being subject to control under standards less stringent 
than clear and present danger in any form. Recognition of these 
different levels, especially in the offensive speech 116 and commer-
cial speech 117 cases, is one of the most important recent develop-
ments in First Amendment methodology. 
Within the broad approach of identifying speech entitled to some 
but not full First Amendment protection, two approaches are possi-
113 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). The first inclinations that there 
were stirrings in the corpse of Dennis came from its employment in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a powerful demonstration that the current standard is the 
Dennis formula subject to a clear and present danger threshold, see Van Alstyne, note 109 
supra. 
114 Sec Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc. 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
115 102 S. Ct. at 3357-58. 
116 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For opposing views of this development, compare Farber, note 79 
supra, with Stone, note 14 supra. 
117 E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). Academic criticisms of the offensive speech developments has tended in the direction 
of objecting to the use of a lower standard, e.g., Stone, note 14 supra, but most objections to 
the commercial speech cases have been along the lines that commercial speech should have 
remainded outside the First Amendment. E.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the 
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976); Emerson, note 79 supra; Jackson & Jeffries, 
Commercial Speec~: Economic Due Process and the First Ammdment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
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ble. One is to determine a priori, without reference to potential 
justifications for restriction, that speech within a given category is 
entitled to a particular level of protection. A test is then formulated 
that applies to any putative restriction within that category. This 
approach characterizes the recent commercial speech cases, with 
the four-part standard of Central Hudson 118 being applied to a wide 
range of possible restrictions of commercial speech. 
Alternatively, a more particular test may be established by refer-
ence not only to the value of the speech within the category, but 
also to a particular justification for regulating that category. It is 
this approach that is seen in the fighting words cases, 119 the offen-
sive speech cases, 120 and the defamation cases. 121 Thus the Court 
has never said that all factually false speech is to be measured 
against the same standard, or that all offensive speech is to be 
treated alike. Instead it weighs speech value against the strength of 
a particular state justification, such as that in protecting reputation 
in the defamation cases and in preventing urban decay in Young. It 
is tempting to follow the accepted wisdom and say that the Court 
balances the interests involved, but the balancing metaphor seems 
inapt, because it suggests, as with real scales, that one side simply 
does or does not outweigh the other. But this does not seem com-
pletely accurate in the First Amendment context, for in none of the 
cases under discussion does one interest win and the other lose. 
Rather, the Court attempts to accommodate worthy but conflicting 
interests in a way that both interests survive to some extent. The 
resulting accommodation rule, when applied in particular cases, 
will-as in defamation, fighting words, and offensive speech-
often produce the result of nonprotection, but here that result flows 
from a rule that is in turn premised on the determination that some 
forms of speech are entitled to only partial First Amendment pro-
tection. 
Once we recognize this distinction between ways of dealing with 
118 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 
{1980). The wording of the test is slightly different in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981). 
119 E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 
(1972). 
120 See note I 16 supra. See also Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
121 E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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partially protected speech, the path followed by the Court in Ferber 
becomes apparent. As with commercial speech, some offensive 
speech, and some factually false speech, the Court holds child por-
nography to be within the First Amendment, but deserving less 
than maximum First Amendment protection. Unlike the commer-
cial speech cases, however, the Court does not take this as 
justification for establishing a general rule applicable to any regula-
tion of that category. Rather, it follows the defamation cases, and to 
some extent the fighting words cases, 122 in custom tailoring an 
accommodation rule to a specific state interest. 
Ill. CODIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Although the Ferber methodology thus seems closest to that 
employed in the defamation and fighting words cases, it takes some 
effort to isolate this path to nonprotection from the Court's re-
peated references to cases and standards supporting a number of 
different doctrinal approaches. In large part this process of extract-
ing bits and pieces from different strands of First Amendment 
doctrine is explained by Ferber's presentation of an issue that was 
both factually and doctrinally novel. Given this novelty, it is 
neither surprising nor cause for criticism that the Court felt com-
pelled to rely on many cases and doctrines of only indirect rele-
vance. 
The product of this process was the creation of yet another com-
paratively distinct area of First Amendment doctrine. The rules 
relating to child pornography now take their place alongside the 
equally distinct rules relating to obscenity, defamation, advocacy of 
illegal conduct, invasion of privacy, 123 fighting words, symbolic 
speech, 124 and offensive speech. Moreover, each of these areas con-
tains its own corpus of subrules, principles, categories, qualifi-
122 I refer not only to the recent cases, note 119 supra, but also to the "slight value" 
interpretation of Chaplinsky. See note 99 supra. 
123 Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide a pure invasion of privacy case not 
involving either aspects of falsity or commercial misappropriation, suggestions of a distinct 
approach are found in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
Moreover, a rather discrete standard of "newsworthiness" can be discerned in lower court 
cases. E.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). 
124 The extent to which symbolic speech is a separate doctrinal category depends on 
whether the Court is taken at its word in limiting the O'Brim test to cases involving symbolic 
speech. See note 80 supra. 
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cations, and exceptions. There are also special principles for par-
ticular contexts, such as government employment, 125 the public 
forum, 126 and electronic broadcasting, I27 and in addition we have 
the pervasive tools of First Amendment analysis, such as chilling 
effect, 128 prior restraint, 129 vagueness, 130 overbreadth, 131 and the 
least restrictive alternative. 132 Finally, there is the additional over-
lay of numerous broad approaches to a First Amendment issue. 
When we take all of this together it becomes clear that the First 
Amendment is becoming increasingly intricate, which has 
prompted one scholar to observe pejoratively that First Amend-
ment doctrine is beginning to resemble the Internal Revenue 
Code. 133 The metaphor rings true, and maybe we are moving to-
ward codification of the First Amendment. Whether this is cause 
for concern requires a closer look. 
In talking about "codification," neither I nor anyone else is sug-
gesting that the First Amendment itself should be codified. It is just 
fine as written-brief, elegant, and desirably vague, while still 
eloquently suggesting great strength and breadth. Nor would we 
want to organize the surrounding doctrine in a form that could be. 
literally codified in a way that the Internal Revenue Code is. That 
approach would sacrifice too much flexibility for only a slight in-
• 0 0 
crease m preciSion. 
It does not follow from the foregoing, however, that First 
Amendment doctrine should be as simple and vague as the Amend-
ment itself. The arguments for textual simplicity do not apply with 
m E.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Mt. Healthy City 
School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
126 See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech itt Public Places, 1974 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT 
REVIEW 233; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Fontm: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 St:PRE.\IECOt:RT 
REVIEW I. The most recent case is Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
127 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
128 See generally Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Ammdmellt: Unraveling the "Chilling 
Effect," 58 B. U.L. REV. 685 (1978). 
129 E.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
130 E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 
390 u.s. 676 (1968). 
m See Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3359-64. 
ll2 E.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2622 (1982); United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
m Conversation with William Van Alstyne. 
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equal or even any force to doctrinal simplicity. A characteristic 
feature of American law is drafting simple textual instruments with 
the expectation that courts will use the open-ended text as the 
touchstone for creating, in modified common law style, a complex 
and comprehensive doctrinal structure. 134 This feature pervades 
not only constitutional law but American statutory law as well. 135 
That tradition alone suggests that great complexity in First 
Amendment doctrine is no cause for surprise. Moreover, taking 
Schenck as the starting point, 136 we have now had sixty-four years' 
experience with First Amendment problems. As time goes on situa-
tions repeat themselves. We are then more able to discern patterns, 
and these patterns enable us to group recurring features into legal 
rules and categories. The more we have seen, the less likely we are 
to be surprised, and open-ended flexibility becomes progressively 
less important. In the face of this, we must shift the burden and ask 
whether there is any reason for treating the First Amendment spe-
cially in terms of doctrinal simplicity. 137 
The desire for simplicity in First Amendment doctrine is often 
expressed in terms of a search for "coherence. "138 The contempo-
rary way to praise a theory (especially your own) is to describe it as 
"coherent," and coherence, in the sense of everything fitting to-
gether without inconsistencies, seems on its face to be a worthy 
goal. 139 But coherence need not produce simplicity. An intricate 
134 Cf LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). 
135 Examples of simple and vague statutory languag~ that have generated enormously 
complex doctrines include Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1981). 
136 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). To take Sche11ck as the starting point 
seems justifiable, but it is an oversimplification. See Gunther, Leamed H01rd a11d the Origirrs of 
Modem First Amendment Doctri11e: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); 
Rabban, The First Amendment i11lts Forgotten Years, 90 YALEL.j. 514 (1981). 
137 The desire for simplicity need not be unique to the First Amendment. See Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one Equal 
Protection Clause .... It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some 
cases and a different standard in other cases"). 
138 E.g., HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 425 (1981); Emerson, note 79 
supra, at 474; Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982); Stark, Book 
Review, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 272 (1982). 
139 Much of modern legal, political, and moral theory is based on a coherence perspective, 
in the sense of assuming or arguing that all of our values do, can, or should fit together. E.g., 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RAWLS, A THEqRY OF jUSTICE (1971); 
RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971); GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORAL-
ITY (1978). But maybe our values do not, or can not, fit together. See BERLIN, CONCEPTS 
AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EsSAYS {Hardy ed. 1979); Williams, Corrjlicts of Values, in 
THE IDEA OF FREED0:\1: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 221 (Ryan ed. 1979). 
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doctrinal structure might still fit together like a jigsaw puzzle, with 
each principle fitting neatly into the exceptions in another. 140 But 
that approach requires enormous foresight to produce such preci-
sion in rules designed to govern the future. A coherent but complex 
doctrinal structure, devoid of gaps or inconsistencies, attempts to 
follow the model of a pure civil law system. 141 Attempting to for-
mulate such a doctrinal system suffers from the same deficiency 
that has led the pure civil law model to be only a futile dream; no 
matter how carefully we define our concepts, new situations will 
arise that just do not fit. First Amendment doctrine serves the 
normative function of guiding future action, and we cannot incor-
porate into our standards intended to guide the future every contin-
gency because we just do not know what they will be. Because "we 
are men, not gods,"142 we can at best imperfectly predict the future, 
and the uncertainty of the human condition places insurmountable 
obstacles in the way of formulating a coherent and complete system 
of highly specific norms th~t will cover every situation likely to 
arise. Ferber itself is a perfect example, because the phenomenon of 
child pornography is so new that it would have been impossible to 
predict even ten years ago. And there is no reason to believe that 
ten years from now we will not be presented with First Amend-
ment issues that we have no way of foreseeing today. 
But we should not be too quick to dismiss the search for coher-
ence. For coherence is more commonly urged as a simple and 
unitary principle of the First Amendment, 143 with more specific 
rules and doctrines being no more than applications of the one 
unifying principle. If the First Amendment is taken "really" to 
mean x, and xis simple, we have a coherent principle by definition. 
But will any single principle help in deciding cases? One would 
think, after all, that that is a major purpose of the exercise. 
A single principle, defined at a high level of abstraction, certainly 
assists in terms of flexibility. An abstract single principle will be 
140 Such a view is implicit in, e.g., BARRY, POUTICAL ARGt:~IE.'IT (1965); FRIED, RIGHT 
AND \VRO:-IG (1978). 
141 See BE.'ITHA~l, OF LAWS I:--1 GE.'IERAL (Hart ed. 1970). 
142 HART, THE CO:-ICEPT OF LAW 125 (1961). 
143 Sec note 138 supra. See also Baker, Scope of the First Ame11dme11t Freedom of Speech, 25 
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 964 (1978); Richards, Free Speech a11d Obsce11ity Law: Toward a Moral Theory 
of the First Ammdmellt, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). The various theories referred to differ 
in degree of complexity, but they hold in common a commitment to a single strong unifying 
theme. 
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able to accommodate almost any foreseeable and unforeseeable 
change in the nature of First Amendment problems. But that very 
flexibility is a crippling weakness, for unitary abstract principles 
can also accommodate any more particularized intuition of the de-
signer or applier of the principle. Use of a single principle to deal 
with all of our problems produces application that is more likely to 
be conclusory than principled. 
As an example, let us take the single principle of "self-
realization," which at the moment is enjoying a good run in the 
arena of First Amendment theory. 144 Faced with the problem in 
First National Bank of Boston v. BellottP45 whether to grant First 
Amendment protection to corporate speech, one self-realization 
theorist has argued against the result in that case because self-
realization is a right of individuals and does not apply to corpora-
tions. 146 But another, starting from the same principle, has reached 
the opposite conclusion by emphasizing the self-realization goals 
served by the receipt of information. 147 Similarly, self-realization 
could produce opposite results in Gertz, 148 depending on whether 
we focused, on the one hand, on the effect on self-realization of 
being the subject of false statements or, on the other hand, on the 
self-realization of the defamer in being unfettered in his com-
municative acts. And self-realization might lead to either of oppos-
ing conclusions about Ferber, varying with whether we focused on 
the self-realization of the children or the producers. I have picked 
self-realization only as an example, for a similar lack of predictive 
value could be identified in any other single principle of equivalent 
abstraction. 149 
The problem of excess abstraction does not surround every sin-
gle-principle theory. A sufficiently narrow principle could serve 
the function of influencing if not completely determining the deci-
144 E.g., Baker, note 143 supra; Redish, note 138 supra; Richards, note 143 supra. Others 
take self-realization or a very similar value (e.g., self-fulfillment) as important but not exclu-
sive. E.g., EMERS0:-1, note 106 supra, at 6-7; TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 578-79. 
145 435 u.s. 765 (1978). 
146 Baker, Realizi11g SelfRealizatioll: Corporate Political Expmditures a11d Redish's The Value of 
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982). 
147 Redish, SelfRealizatioll, Democracy, a11d Freedom of Expressio11: A Reply to Profe.<sor Baker, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982). 
148 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
149 E.g., "human rights," "liberty," and "autonomy." 
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sian of actual cases. Meiklejohn's original theory was both narrow 
and single-principled, 150 a feature shared by other political in-
terpretations of the First Amendment. 151 But a precise single prin-
ciple must be consequently narrow, and the problem then is that 
much seems to have been left out of the First Amendment. 152 
But why must we assume that the First Amendment has a 
unitary essence? The First Amendment might instead be the sim-
plifying rubric under which a number of different values are sub-
sumed. 153 We wish to prevent government from silencing its critics, 
but we wish as well to prevent an imposed uniformity in literary 
and artistic taste, to preserve open inquiry in the sciences and other 
academic fields, and to foster wide-ranging argument on moral, 
religious, and ethical questions. This list is representative rather 
than exhaustive, but it shows that the concept of freedom of speech 
may not have one central core. 154 And each distinct but interrelated 
foundational principle may generate its own rules of application. 
Professor Thomas Emerson identifies several justifications for the 
First Amendment but then argues that a single principle of applica-
tion can reflect all of those diverse values. 155 But this seems coun-
terintuitive, for if a number of diverse values are served by the First 
Amendment, it would seem more likely that an equally diverse 
doctrinal structure would result. 
Although doctrinal simplicity is also thought to minimize the 
opportunity for interpretive error, this is questionable. As the 
number of available categories increases, so does the frequency of 
opportunity for putting a case in the wrong category. But with this 
comes a decrease in the possibility of error within a category. 
Larger categories minimize the risk of picking the wrong category, 
but smaller and more numerous categories lessen the chance of 
judicial flexibility or manipulation within a category. 
150 MEIKLEJOHN, note 1 supra. 
151 See Bark, note 1 supra .• Professor BeVier uses strategic considerations for broadening 
coverage. BeVier, note 1 supra. 
152 See TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 578-79. CJ. Shiffrin, note 13 supra. 
m Presumably these different values have some relationship with each other, but that 
does not mean that there must be one unifying factor or common theme. The relationship 
may be that of a "family resemblance." See WITTGE.'ISTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS§§ 65-72 (2d ed. Anscombe trans. 1958). 
154 See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 14 (1982). 
155 E.\IERSON, note 106 supra; Emerson, note 79 supra. 
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Moreover, a strategy of fewer and larger categories is likely to be 
less protective of speech. If Brandenburg were applicable to utter-
ances within the First Amendment, leaving the courts with a sim-
ple "in-or-out, aU-or-nothing" choice, recognition of some strong 
interests, as we inevitably must, would leave large categories of 
speech totally unprotected by the First Amendment. Defamation, 
commercial speech, fighting words, and invasion of privacy, for 
example, would still be on the outside of the First Amendment 
fighting to get in if the only choice were to give full protection along 
Brandenburg lines. 156 
Categorization, in the sense of treating different forms of speech 
differently, 157 thus is not necessarily speech restrictive. It is incon-
ceivable that we will ignore such well-established governmental 
concerns as safety, reputation, protection against fraud, and protec-
tion of children. If we try to force all cases within the Fir~t Amend-
ment into some sort of a clear and present danger mold, we would 
likely discover that clarity need not be so clear, immediacy not be 
so immediate, and danger not be so dangerous. Certain state inter-
ests are inevitably going to be recognized, and the alternatives then 
are diluting those tests that are valuable precisely because of their 
strength, or formulating new tests and categories that leave existing 
standards strong within their narrower range. 
I do not mean that creating any new category is desirable for its 
own sake. Unsound categories can be created; the "offensiveness" 
category of Young and Pacifica is a prime example. 158 But taking the 
creation of one bad category as a warrant to condemn all creation of 
new categories is an exaggerated deployment of the already over-
used "slippery slope" principle. 159 Some slopes are slipperier than 
others, and one of the functions of the courts is to place handholds 
on the slopes for the very purpose of preventing a slide all the way 
to the bottom. 160 Although it requires a bit of an act of faith, it is 
156 With respect to fighting words, however, the standard that emerges after Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and its progeny has significant Brandmburg overtones. 
157 On the multiple uses of the term "categorization" in First Amendment analysis, see 
Schauer, note 13 supra. 
158 See Gunther, The Highest Court, the Toughest Issues, STA:-.IFORD MAGAZI:-.!E, Fall-
Winter 1978, at 34; Shiffrin, note 13 supra, at 951. 
159 Overuse of "slippery slope" and "abuse of power" arguments is hardly new, nor is 
reaction against it. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344-45 (1816). 
160 
"The power tci tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. 
v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.). 
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possible to create new categories within the First Amendment 
without entirely eating away the principles of free speech. A nar-
row but strong First Amendment, with its strong principle univer-
sally available for all speech covered by the First Amendment, has 
much to be said for it. First Amendment protection can be like an 
oil spill, thinning out as it broadens. But excess precautions against 
this danger might lead to a First Amendment that is so narrow as to 
thwart its major purposes. 
From this perspective it appears likely that the Court chose the 
proper approach to Ferber. Had it focused more on the "compel-
ling" or "surpassing" interest in children and thus decided the case 
along clear and present danger lines, Brandenburg might have been 
diluted, with unfortunate consequences if that dilution were then 
available to assess the probability and immediacy of the danger 
presented by the Communist Party. And if the Court had focused 
exclusively on the "noncovered" approach and decided the case 
along Beauhamais-Roth-Paris lines, the current notion of virtually 
complete worthlessness in a First Amendment sense might simi-
larly have been diluted, with dangers to other forms of speech 
having some but not central First Amendment value. 
Ferber reflects the Court's continuing recognition of the diversity 
of speech and the diversity of state interests. It is unrealistic to 
expect that one test, one category, or one analytical approach can 
reflect this diversity. As the First Amendment is broadened to 
include the hitherto uncovered, diversity within the First Amend-
ment increases. In addressing different problems separately, the 
Court is doing nothing more than following the common law 
model. Contract and tort are distinct because they address different 
concerns, and changes in the world and the broadening of the First 
Amendment make it likely that it will encompass problems as di-
verse as the difference between tort and contract. A unitary ap-
proach is likely to be both counterproductive and futile. 
It is, of course, possible to go too far. Because no two speech acts 
or governmental concerns are identical, categorization is in one way 
artificial. 161 This would suggest an ad hoc approach to First Amend-
ment adjudication, with unfortunate consequences. Although it is 
not a necessary truth that ad hoc determinations lead to excess defer-
ence to legislative determinations of the dangers posed by speech, 
161 See Stephan, note 47 supra, at 214 n.49. 
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such a conclusion is empirically sound. 162 Many First Amendment 
values are counterintuitive, 163 and many First Amendment litigants 
are despicable individuals with ridiculous or offensive things to say. 
Judges are human, and rather large categories still seem the best 
precaution against First Amendment standards being eroded by the 
passions of the moment. 
Even without case-by-case adjudication, there are dangers in ex-
cess complexity. Doctrines can become so complex that they go 
beyond the interpretive and comprehensive abilities of those who 
must apply them. We should not become so concerned with doc-
trinal beauty at the Supreme Court level that we lose sight of the 
more important role of the Court as provider of guidance for lower 
courts and legislatures. 164 
Doctrinal complexity inevitably requires the courts to evaluate 
the relative worth of particular categories of speech. Some degree of 
this is both necessary and desirable, but again we can go too far. I 
remain to be convinced that there is a clear line of demarcation 
between viewpoint and subject-matter discrimination, 165 because 
subject-matter discrimination can, by entrenching the status quo, 
be viewpoint discrimination in sheep's clothing. Excess categoriza-
tion can thus indirectly increase the likelihood of viewpoint dis-
crimination, thereby producing some of the very dangers the First 
Amendment was designed to prevent. 
Finally, excess categorization can reduce flexibility. Any rule or 
doctrine buys flexibility with the currency of predictability, but the 
converse is equally true. 166 Making First Amendment doctrine 
more precise makes it easier both to decide cases and to predict the 
outcome of First Amendment litigation. But that ease of decision 
reduces our ability to deal with new forms of communication or 
new state interests. The Ferber approach to novelty was to create a 
new category, but too much precision in existing doctrine will 
162 See Shiffrin, note 13 supra, at 961. Compare Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality 011 a 
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STA~. L. REV. 1001 (1972). See generally 
Bogen, Balancing FreetkJm of Speech, 38 MD. L. REV. 387 (1979); Henkin, Infallibility under 
Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLt:M. L. REV. 1022 (1978). 
163 See EMERSO~, note 106 supra, at 12. 
164 See Corr, Retroactivity Revisited: A Case Study in Supreme Court Doctrine ''As Applied," 61 
N.C.L. REV.-- (1983). 
IM See Stone, note 14 supra. 
166 See generally HART, note 142 supra. 
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make such a course difficult. In that case the response to novelty 
may be a dilution of existing standards unless there is sufficient 
flexibility. If the fringe is not loose, we may discover too late that 
the core has been jeopardized. 
The increasing complexity of First Amendment doctrine, as 
most recently demonstrated by Ferber's creation of another distinct 
doctrinal category, is in itself not a cause for criticism, but rather 
the inevitable by-product of broadening the First Amendment. It is 
also the expected offspring of the increased sophistication that 
comes from our increasing familiarity with settled factual patterns 
in the First Amendment. But it is possible to become so sophis-
ticated that we lose sight of first principles. Ferber is an especially 
noteworthy step on the route to complexity. That is no cause for 
alarm, but it is time to look a bit further down the road. 

